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論文摘要
本文主要研究資本結構、國有股權與企業產品市場行為之間的關係'並嘗試解




採用 2007-08 年中國上市公司的季度數據，進一步的經驗分析顯示: ( 1 )當宏
觀經濟環境趨惡時，高負債企業較其同行業競爭者會喪失更多的市場份額; (2) 
債務比例與企業市場份額的負相關性，在低枉桿行業中更為顯著; (3) 國有股




This paper studies the implication of financial structures and state ownership on 
firms' product market behavior. We develop a theoretical model in which two firms 
with different debt level, consumers facing switching cost and the state shareholder 
operate together, to determine the product price and market share of each company. 
We present four theoretical predictions on the interaction between financial structure, 
state ownership, and firm's product market performance. 
Consistent with these predictions, using data of Chinese listed firms over the 
2007-08 recession, we provide evidence that the firm with higher leverage than 
industry peers tends to loss larger market shares when there is a negative shock to 
the economy. We also find that the negative effect of debt burden is stronger for 
firms that operate in industries with low debt level. Additionally, we show that for 
state-owned firms the market share losses during recession is less significant than a 
private firm with similar leverage level. Finally, we show that when the proportion of 
state shares is lower than 50%, its benefit increases, while when the proportion of 
state shares exceeds 50o/o, state ownership is less helpful in preventing leveraged 
firm from losing market share during recession. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) propose that in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy 
costs, and asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is 
unaffected oy how that firm is financed. Modigliani-Miller's capital structure 
irrelevance principle has been challenged by a lot of literature demonstrating how 
financial structure choice impact companies' incentive to produce and invest. 1 
Starting with the work on agency cost by J ens en & Meckling ( 197 6) and Myers 
(1977), most of the attention has been devoted to show how the capital structure 
introduces conflicts of interests among investors (e.g., shareholders versus 
bondholders) and between investors and managers? And high leverage emerges as a 
way of mitigating incentive problems through reducing the free cash flow available 
for spending at the discretion of managers (Jensen, 1986). These literatures, however, 
take the firm as unit of analysis and ignore the interaction between product market 
competition and a firm's financing decisions. When faced with such competition, 
firms may use financial leverage strategically to affect a rival 's 
behavior and thus alter the competitive outcome. 
Although some recent contributions have attempt to explore the implication of 
financial structures on firms' product market behavior, the characteristics of the 
interaction between firm's financial structure and real business performance has 
remained an ambiguous issue. First, conflicting view exists as to whether leverage 
has positive or negative impact on firm's competitiveness. Second, researchers have 
1 See All en & Win ton ( 1995) 
2 See Harris and Raviv ( 1991) and Myers (2002) for review of the literature. 
questioned the direction of causality between product market competition and 
financial structure. Third, almost all of the literature focuses on firms in developed 
countries, while the features of Chinese firms largely remain unknown. 
This paper. focuses on these three questions and tries to empirically examine 
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how a firm's financial structure and ownership structure influences its behavior in 
the product market as well as other industry peers, thereby influencing the 
competitive outcome. 
We investigate the product market competition to shed light on the mechanism 
through which financing decisions and ownership structure influence real corporate 
performance. We propose and test a theory of product market competition in which 
firms face capital market imperfections and consumers face switching costs. In our 
model, there are two firms producing similar products with different brands. They 
operate to maximize the total profits in a two-stage game, while the profit is jointly 
determined by market share and sale price. Consumers have various tastes and face 
switching cost when they change the brand in case of bankruptcy of previous 
supplier. We assume that consumers are rational individuals who take into account 
the price of products, their preference, and the switching cost when they choose a 
brand. The two companies are also rational agents that if they expect high 
bankruptcy probability in the second stage, they will charge high price to maximize 
the profit in the first state; otherwise they may lower the price so that the increased 
market share will benefit them in the second period. The probability of bankruptcy is 
determined by the economy, the capital structure of both companies, and the state 
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ownership. We summarize the predictions of the model into three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The firm with higher leverage than industry peers tends to loss 
larger market shares when there is a negative shock to the economy. 
Hypothesis . 2: When there is a negative shock to the economy the firm with 
I 
higher leverage than industry peers tends to loss larger market shares if it operates 
in an industry with low debt level. 
Hypothesis 3a: The state ownership of companies has a positive contribution to 
the firm performance when they adopt higher degrees of leverage than industry 
average. 
Hypothesis 3h: The effect increases with the growth of state ownership ratio. 
Our empirical tests are conducted during the 2007-08 recession period, where the 
exogenous, economy-wide market shifts make the financial constraints more binding 
and thus alter the behavior of firms, rivals, consumers and government. Our main 
focus is on the market share growth sensitivity to the company's financial leverage 
relative to industry peers in condition of negative demand shock. The main empirical 
results are as follows. First, the pre-existing debt burden has negative effect on firm's 
market share growth during recession, and the magnitude of this effect is determined 
by the industry characteristics. Specifically, if the company operates in an industry 
where low leverage is prevailing, it will be impacted more seriously by the debt 
burden. On contrary, if the company operates in a high leveraged industry, the 
negative impact of debt burden becomes not so significant. Second, we also examine 
the extent to which the state shareholder influences the interaction between firm 
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financing and product market outcome. Generally speaking, state ownership 
mitigates the leverage effect. The market share growth of state-owned leveraged 
firms exceeds those without or with less state shareholding. However, this benefit 
disappears when government becomes the majority shareholder (with more than 
50o/o shares). 
Our paper adds to the theoretical literature on the interaction of financial 
leverage and product market performance. The innovation of this paper is to 
introduce state shareholder into the traditional framework composed of consumers, 
company, and industry rival. As far as we know, none of the existing literatures have 
analyzed these factors simultaneously. The empirical evidence of this paper adds to 
previous literature by showing the consistent results using Chinese data. Further, our 
paper is the first attempt to exam the beneficial effect of state ownership for high 
leverage companies during recession. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the 
literature on capital structure and product market performance. In Chapter 3, we 
develop a model analyzing the impact of financial constraints and ownership 
structure on the cyclicality of market shares. In Chapter4, we focus on one specific 
event window: the 2007-08 recession. The detailed tests of this chapter address the 
first and second hypothesis of our model prediction. In Chapter 5, we explore the 
special characteristics of Chinese firms-- the state ownership. Literature and stories 
are reviewed and proposed in this chapter. And the tests verify our third hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical review 
In this section, I will briefly summarize the theories related to the interaction 
between firm's financial structure and product market performance. 
On one hand, the argument that high leverage has positive impact on firms' 
product market performance is developed from the "strategic commitment" theory of 
Brander and Lewis (1986). They build a model of Coumot (quantity) duopoly 
competition and show that when debt has limited liability (Equity holders receive the 
residual beyond the fixed debt obligation in good states and losses are bounded by 
the value of salvageable assets in bankruptcy states), Coumot firms subject to some 
output market uncertainty will use debt to show the commitment to large output 
stances in an attempt to gain a strategic advantage and thus the low levered firms 
will reduce their output to avoid loss. As a result low leveraged firms will behave 
less aggressively and high leveraged firms should experience market share gains. 
Other papers have also made important contribution to this approach. Showalter 
( 1995) considers Bertrand (price) competition, and demonstrates that the strategic 
debt choice depends on the type of uncertainty in the product market. Under cost 
uncertainty firms avoid debt, since it causes prices and profits to fall. Under demand 
uncertainty, however, firms use strategic debt to keep prices and profits high. 
On the other hand, a contrary view exists that high leverage level will negatively 
affect firms' product market performance. There are two explanations supporting this 
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argument. First, the initial level of debt may negatively affect performance because 
highly indebted firms may be unable to finance large new investments (Myers, 1977). 
This debt overhang might force leveraged firms to pass up profitable growth 
opportunities and, in the most extreme cases, even force them out of the market. As 
I 
Myers (1977) points out, this problem is more likely to arise when investments 
cannot be collateralized easily. 
Second, the level of debt may negatively affect performance because it directly 
affects a firm's ability to compete. For example, Telser (1966) suggests that 
dependence on outside financing can result in financial fragility and thus a high 
leveraged firm is more vulnerable to unconstrained rivals' competition. The basic 
story suggests that ''long purse" - accessibility to financial reserves-allows 
companies to pose a credible threat of "predatory pricing" strategy to existing 
competitors and to potential entrants. And this strategy only works if the high 
leveraged firms can not raise fund and reduce their leverage. Bolton and Scharfstein 
( 1990) further formalized this argument by presenting a model in which predators 
could take advantage of high leveraged firms ' need to refinancing by making them 
appear unprofitable, thereby adversely affects the agency relationship between the 
rival's investors and manager and motivating their investors to cut off funding . A 
basic result from this line of research is that the firms that have lower leverage will 
perform aggressive, while the high leveraged firms will behave passively and even 
suffer from the cutthroat competition. 
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2.2 Empirical review 
In support of "strategic commitment" theory, Showalter (1999) empirically 
examine the strategic use of debt. In a test of all manufacturing firms operating for at 
least 11 years · over the 20 year period 197 5-1994, he find firms hold more debt as 
I 
demand uncertainty rises, and use less leverage as costs become less certain. 
On the side of "long purse" theory, although it has received much attention, it is 
the recent work by Chevalier (1995a, b), Kovenock and Phillips (1995, 1997), and 
Campello and Fluck (2006) that provides the first empirical evidence on this issue. 
Chevalier (1995a) examines the change of industry pricing following a wave of 
leveraged buyout (LBO) of supermarkets in 1980's. She finds that supermarkets that 
have increased leverage through a LBO tend to face a greater threat of price 
competition by financially unconstrained rivals. Consistent with Chevalier's finding, 
by examines the association between financial structure and industry output in four 
industries in which the largest firms used leveraged recapitalization to increase debt 
ratios by at least twenty five percent, Phillips ( 1995) finds that most firms that 
increased leverage experienced sales decreases, market share lose or did not increase 
their market share when other firms exist the industry. 
Although the literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the analysis of the 
implications of firm's financial structure choice on product market competition, a 
common element of most of the existing literature is that the firms studied have 
increased their leverage substantially, through a recent LBO or recapitalization. This 
approach may suffer from two econometric problems. First, we can not tell it is the 
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firms' capital structure that affects market performance or rather foresighted manager 
adjusts capital structure according to potential product market outcomes. Second, the 
empirical link between capital structure and competitive performance may be only 
the spurious causality that both the capital structure and firm's performance are 
I 
influenced by other unobserved factors such as industry concentration, excess 
capacity, and growth (see Kovenock and Phillips, 1997; and Zingales, 1998). 
My study therefore designs an alternative test for the theory. Instead of measure 
firm's performance after capital structure changes, I look at the sensitivity of firm's 
performance to pre-existing financial leverage following macro-environment shock 
that is exogenous to firm's capital structure choice. 
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Chapter 3 The model 
The model we present below predicts the impact of capital structure on firm's 
market share over business cycle. Of the existing literature, our model is closest in 
spirit to Campello and Fluck (2006) in which the cyclicality of firm's market share 
due to financial constraints varies depending on the capital structure of the firm itself 
and of the firm's rivals. However, our model differs from Campello and Fluck (2006) 
in that we not only model the impact of capital market imperfection on firms, 
creditors and consumers, but also we further introduce the state as an equity holder. 
In our model, rival firms produce different brands of the same product and face 
capital market imperfections when raising external finance. These firms compete for 
consumers who differ in their preferences and for whom switching brands (across 
producers) is potentially costly. In such an environment, there is a trade-off between 
short- and long-term profit maximization. Producers can maximize profits in the 
long run by charging lower prices at first (to build up market shares), subsequently 
raising prices to profit from locked-in costumers. Such investment in market share is 
profitable in the long run, but it is costly in the short run. The incentive to favor 
long-term profit maximization at the expense of short-term results may depend on 
the firms' ability to survive in the long term. When consumers choose a brand, they 
understand that capital market frictions may drive their supplier out of business and 
take into account the welfare loss that firm bankruptcy imposes upon them. The state 
will have no action if the firm can serve the debt by itself, but it may exempt the 
firm's debt in case the firm faces the risk of bankruptcy. 
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3.1 Story and structure 
In our story there are two firms A and B, who produce similar goods for the same 
customers and compete in periods 1 and period 2. There are two states of nature in 
the first period, the good state H and the bad state L. The total demand for the 
product is eH in state H and eL in state L ( eH > eL ). The probability of state H 
1s J.l and the expected demand for the industry in the first period 
is e = J.leH + (1- J.l )eL . The demand in second period is normalized to 1. 
Suppose firms A and Bare located at the two endpoints of the line segment [0,1]. 
Consumers are uniformly distributed over the same interval and have a per-unit 
reservation pnce R for the good. Each consumer incurs a cost ty when 
purchasing goods from A and t(1- y) when buying from B, where y and 
(1- y) stands for the distance of preference of consumer y to firms A and B, 
respectively, and t is the per-unit utility cost associated with that distance. The 
distant cost is used to stand for consumer's preference for goods produced by 
different firms. For example, suppose there is a consumer 0 who is located at the 
same end point as firm A, then his cost of buying goods from A equals to 0 ( t x 0 ) 
and the cost of purchasing from B equals to t ( t x (1- 0) ), which means firm A's 
product is his ideal product. 
The profits of A and Bin period 2 will be 
;r; = (R- c2 )alA 
Jr: = (R- c2 )a Is 
Where R is the per-unit reservation price of consumer, c2 is the marginal cost 
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for both firms in the second period, and a 1A and a 1
8 are A's and B 's market shares 
built in period 1. 
A consumer may have to switch to a different brand in the second period if his 
supplier is liquidated in the first period. The consumer will take this into account 
when he decides whether to buy from firm A or B in period 1. He chooses to buy 
from firm A rather than firm B in the first period if 
(1) 
where fJA is the probability that firm A is liquidated in the first period and s 
is the switching cost when consumer has to switch to a different brand in the second 
period. The probability of liquidation in the first period ( fJA and {3 8) is determined 
by the natural state and the financial status of firm A and B in that period. 
Notice from ( 1) that when deciding which brand to choose consumers take into 
account the prices competitors charge, the disutility of consuming a particular brand 
as opposed to the consumer's ideal choice, the likelihood of each firm being 
liquidated after the first period, and the costs of switching to a different brand after 
habits are formed. The lower the price a supplier charges the larger market share it 
gets in the first period. If the probability of liquidation is the same for both firms, 
then this probability does not affect consumer's choice. If, for example, the 
probability of liquidation for firm A exceeds that of firm B and the switching costs 
are high enough, then more consumers might choose to stay away from A in the first 
period. 
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3.2 Two-period model development 
In the first period, each firm takes into account that their pricing decisions will 
have an impact on their market shares and profits both in the first and second period. 
From (1) we could get 
yE[O,l] 
which stands for all the consumers who will purchase goods from firm A. Thus 
given each firm's price, the likelihood of the natural state, and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy and consumer's switching cost, we could derive the market share of firm 
A and B in the first period 
(2) 
In the following analysis, we consider three scenario: the benchmark case in 
which both A and B are internally financed, 
3.2.1 Benchmark case, Scenario 1: both A and Bare internally financed 
In this scenario, the probability of liquidation of the unleveraged firms in the first 
period is zero ( fJA = {3 8 = 0 ). Each firm sets its price to maximize the total profit in 
two periods 
(3) 
B A } 
A p -p In which a = +-
1 2t 2 
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A B 1 
In which a 8 = 1-aA = p - p +-1 1 2t 2 
From the first order condition of firm A's and B 's profit-maximizing decision, we 
obtain 
Set p A = p 8 , we have 
8 R-e PA = p = t +cl - e 2 (4) 
(5) 
Compared with the result of one-period game in a market of perfect competition, 
the first period equilibrium price in this scenario is lower3 . It is because that firm 
profits more in the second period if it can capture a larger consumer base in the first 
period. With internal financing, A and B will split the market equally. 
3.2.2 Scenario 2: both firm A and B are externally financed 
We now consider the alternative scenario in which firms may not fully fund their 
The equilibrium price pA = p 8 = t + c1 
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operations internally, but instead need to ra1se I externally. We assume that a 
financially constrained firm can only pay off its debt in the high demand state H. 
Formally, (p: - c1 )()L rr1A < D ~ (p: - c1 )()H rr1A, where D is the face value of the first 
period debt. In, the event of default in first period, the creditors will liquidate the 
firm's asset. If the assets have not been seized in the first period, the creditors cannot 
enforce any payment from the manager in the second period and manager will divert 
all of n; to himself. 
From the perspective of firm's manager, if he pays off the debt in period 1 and 
continues operation in period 2, the total income is n1A - D + n; ; if he defaults on the 
debt and the creditors liquidate the firm's asset in the first period, the total income 
is n1A • If ;r1A > n1A - D + n; , the manager will break the contract in the first period. 
As a result, the incentive compatible condition 1s n; ~ D (in 
whichn; == (R- c2 )rr1A ). 
If the firm has to liquidate its asset, it will sell them to the highest value 
alternative user ( Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). We assume that if the buyer is an 
industry outsider, the assets are sold as scrap. Thus the company will always sell its 
assets to an industry competitor. Since the creditors can not enforce any payment 
from borrowers in the second period, they will not finance the asset acquisition in 
that period, which means the only fund that could be used to purchase the liquidated 
assets comes from first period's income. Suppose firm A liquidates its assets in first 
period, then the maximum amount firm B is willing and able to afford should be the 
smaller of ( R- c2 )o-1A and (p18 - c1 )BH o-18 - D . So we can use .-t( R - c2 )o-1A to 
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denote of the liquidation value of firm A's asset (A E [0, 1] ). If A= 1, the assets are 
liquidated at the firm's continuation value (R- c2 )a1A • We also assume that 
/t( R - c2 )a1A ~ D , so there is nothing left after paying back the debt, and the 
manager will never receive a positive profit in liquidation. 
In the scenario of two leveraged firms, the probability of liquidation in the first 
period is greater than zero ( fJA = /3 8 > 0 ).Each firm sets its price to maximize the 
total profit in two periods. Take firm A as an example, in good state the manager will 
pay off debt and continue operation in the second period, because according to the 
incentive compatible condition, Tr1A - D + 1r; ~ Tr1A • Thus in good state the manager 
will maximize ()Ha: (p: - c1)- D + ( R - c 2 )a: . In bad state, however, the manager 
does not have the ability to pay off the debt because (p: - c1 )BL a 1A < D . Thus his 
goal is to maximize (p: - c1 )BL a 1A in the first period and then quit the business. On 
the other hand, in good state the creditor receive face value D, while in bad state 
the creditor have to liquidate the assets and receive lt(R- c2 )rr1A • Thus the 
break even condition is J-LD + (1- J-L ).A( R - c2 )rr1A -1 = 0 . Formally, we have 
Which equals to 
B _ A 1 
In which a1A = p p +- = 1 -at 2t 2 
Solve for the first order condition and set p A = p 8 , we obtain 
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A B 1 
a =a =-I 1 2 
Because a leveraged firm is less likely to operate in the second period, it will 
benefit less from building market share and will in turn charge higher prices in the 
first period. We notice that the equilibrium price is higher than the price in the 
(1- J.L)(R- c2 ) unleveraged scenario. The price level in the industry increases by as 
f) 
both firms take on leverage. 
3.2.3 Scenario 3: firm A is leveraged but firm B is not 
Because firm A is unable to pay off its debt in the bad state, the liquidation 
probability fJ A = 1. For the unleveraged firm B, the liquidation probability /38 = 0. 
A p s ~ PA - (1- J1 )s 1 B 
In which a = +- = 1 -a 
l 2f 2 I 
Taking the first order condition for firm A, we get A's reaction function 
(6) 
In contrast, taking p: as g1ven, firm B 's manager will choose p1
8 to 
maximize the profit. 
s PA - p s + (1- J1 )s 1 
In which a 1 = +-2t 2 




8 into (6) and p1A back into (9) we get 
P
A = t + c _ (1- Jl )s __ (1_+_2_JL _____ )( R_---=c2~) 
1 1. . 3 3() 
The comparison above reveals a very interesting result of our analysis: the 
leveraged firm A offers a discount of (1- Jl )s to compensate its consumers for the 
3 
possible welfare losses should their supplier be liquidated in the downturn. In 
(1- JL)S 
contrast, the unleveraged firm B charges a premium of because its 
3 
consumers do not have to switch to another brand in bad state. 
Using p: and p1
8 
we get the market shares of firm A and B, respectively 
A 1 
0"1 = 2 
(1- JL)S 
6t 
3.2.4 Scenario 4, the most complicated case: firm A is leveraged but firm B is 
not, firm A is state-owned enterprise or group affiliated 
In previous scenarios, we assume that the leveraged firm A will definitely be 
liquidated if bad state occurs. However it is not necessarily the case in reality. 
A very common feature of Chinese companies is the state shareholding. Tian 
(200 1) documents a very interesting phenomenon that the statistic relationship 
between state shareholding and corporate value follows a U -shape patter. That is to 
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say, when the government is a small shareholder, firms are valued lower when the 
shareholding stake of the government is higher, but, after a certain threshold, 
corporate value increases with larger size of state shareholding stakes. Tian attributes 
the phenomenon to that the government shareholder gradually turns from a grabbing 
hand to be a helping hand. 
In our theory, we also expect that the government shareholder could bring 
beneficial effect to the leveraged firm A. We follow the intuition that the state-owned 
enterprises which are regarded as members of "national teams" in national and local 
economic development in the PRC (Nolan, 2001), enjoyed governmental support 
and provision of strategic critical resources, such as the access to bank, loans, capital, 
and opportunities of being listed in stock markets. As a result, companies with the 
dominant state ownership could have the ability to continue operating in the second 
period even if it can not pay off the debt in the first period. 
Formally, we assume that in bad state the state-owned financial constrained firm 
A only needs to pay back r D for the debt and the creditors (most of the time it is a 
state-owned bank) will exempt the rest. The value of r rages from 0 to 1, which 
depends on the relation between the company and the state. As a result, the 
probability of liquidation fJA equals to r. Take two extremely cases for example, 
in the first case r equals to 0, firm A pays nothing to the creditors and the default 
probability is 0; in the second case r equals to 1, firm A have to pay back all the 
face value of debt and the default probability is 1, the same as in the scenario 3. 
In good state, firm A acts like an independent company and uses its revenue in 
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the first period to pay back all the debt. The goal of the manager is to maximize 
JL[ ()H CT1A (p: - c1)- D + ( R- c2 )CT:] . In bad state, firm A can not pay back all the 
debt by itself. Thus it will turn for help of the government and try to obtain the 
exemption. · The target of the manager changes to maximize 
together, we arrive at the object function of firm A. 
Taking the first order condition for firm A, we get A's reaction function 
In contrast, taking p: as given, the unleveraged firm B 's manager will choose 
p1B to maximize the profit. 
B P A- PB + y(l- JL )S 1 
In which CT = +-
1 2t 2 
Taking the first order condition for firm B, we get B 's reaction function 
Substitute p1B into ( 6) and p: back into (9) we get 
A y(l-Jt)s (R- c2 ) p, = t +cl - 3 - e 
19 
Using p1A and p 1
8 
we get the market shares of firm A and B, respectively 
A 1 y(1- JL)S 
a=-----
1 2 6t 
B 1 y(1- JL)S 
a=-+---
1 2 6t 
It is very interesting that with the increase of government support ( r ~ 0 ), the 
market share of leveraged firm A approaches 2_ , while with little government 
2 
support ( r ~ 1 ), the leveraged firm A still faces the risk of liquidation and it has 
little incentive to maintain the market share. Firm A's market share loss r(1- JL )s 
6t 
is a function of its relation with the government. 
3.3 Empirical implications 
In this part we derive three testable implications of the effect of leverage on 
firm's market share in business cycle. 
Hypothesis 1: The firm with higher leverage than industry peers tends to loss 
larger market shares when there is a negative shock to the economy. 
The economic intuition of this hypothesis is that facing negative shock, the 
default probability of the leveraged firm in the second period increases. Recall that 
we assume a leveraged firm can not pay back its debt in bad state. Thus the manager 
of a financially constrained firm tends to be short-sighted and he does not have the 
incentive to build market share in the first period. Since the probability (1- JL) 
stands for the likelihood of the appearance of bad state, it is nature that the increase 
of (1- JL) represents the increase of the probability that the bad state will occur. 
Formally, in scenario 3 where firm A is leveraged but firm B is not, we 
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differentiate the leveraged firm's market share a/ and unleveraged firm's market 
share at with respect to (1- J-L), respectively 
a alA == - ( R - c2) - (1- J-L )( R - c2 )( ()H - ()L) - ~ < 0 
8(1- J.1) 6tB 6tB2 6t 
The first order condition supports our economic intuition that within an industry, 
a negative shock will lead to market share losses by the more leveraged firm while 
lead to market share gains by the less leveraged ( unleveraged) firm. In the empirical 
part, we use an exogenous, negative shock to the macroeconomic environment as 
instruments for increase in (1- J-L) . 
Hypothesis 2: When there is a negative shock to the economy the firm with 
higher leverage than industry peers tends to loss larger market shares if it operates 
in an industry with low debt level. 
We use a 1A,L u to denote the market share of leveraged firm A in an industry 
with one leveraged firm and one unleveraged firm (Scenario 3). Because the rival is 
unleveraged, we call this a "low-leverage industry". We use a-1A,LL to denote the 
market share of leveraged firm A in an industry composed of two leveraged firm 
(scenario 2). We call this a "high-leverage industry". Our purpose is to formally 
derive the extent of market share loss of firm A in different scenario when there is a 
negative shock. 
If firm A operates in "low-leverage industry" 
8a-1A == _ (R- c2 ) _ (1- J-L)(R- c2)((}H - (}L) _ ~ < Q 
ao- J-L) 6te 6tB2 6t 
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If firm A operates in "high-leverage industry", 
The implication is consistent with our intuition. In a high-leverage industry, all 
the companies will focus on short-term profit during the recession. As a result, the 
high-debt company A could retain its market share. In contrast, in a low-debt 
industry, because the unleveraged firm B will continue operation in the second 
period and has the incentive to increase its market share in the first period, the 
high-debt company A is likely to experience market share losses. In the empirical 
part, we rank industries according to the industry leverage level and test whether the 
cyclicality of market share of leveraged firms varies across industries. 
Hypothesis 3a: The state ownership of companies has a positive contribution to 
the firm performance when they adopt higher degrees of leverage than industry 
average. 




A,P to denote the market share of private-owned leveraged firm A in 
an industry with one leveraged firm and one unleveraged firm (Scenario 3). We use 
a,A ,s to denote the market share of state-owned leveraged firm A in an industry with 
one leveraged firm and one unleveraged firm (Scenario 4 ). 
The difference between a 1A,s and a,A,P is 
8aA,S 8aA,P (1- y)s (R-C?) 
_ _;;_l__ I = + - >0 
8(1- J-L) 8(1- J-L) 6t 6t() ' rE (0,1) 
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To see the hypothesis 3b formally, denote by y1 and yk ( rk < y1 ) the 
' 'payment ratio" faced by firm A1 and Ak, respectively. Both firm A1 and Ak 
are leveraged firms in low-debt industry. Our model implies that: 
80"1Aj,S _ 8a1A,S = (1-y1 )S _ (1-yk)S = (yk -y)s < Q 
8(1- Jl) 8(1- Jl) 6t 6t 6t 
Where a/1 ,s and 0"1Ak ,s denote the market shares of the leveraged firm A1 
and Ak in low-debt industry. 
The implication is that in a low leveraged industry, if a company has government 
background, it will gain more market share than the private-owned peers in condition 
of negative shocks. The higher the government ownership, the better a leveraged 
firm will perform during recession. The economic intuition behind this hypothesis 
may be that, because of the implicit government guarantee, managers are no longer 
afraid of bankruptcy. As a result, they have the incentive to build up market share in 
early stage. 
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Chapter 4 Evidence on Product Market Competition 
4.1 Background: The 2007-08 Recession 
One approach to minimize the endogeneity of capital structures is to measure the 
company's market performance following exogenous shocks which change the 
macro-environment as well as the company's competitiveness under an existing 
financial structure (Zingales, 1998; Campello and Pluck, 2006). Using Campello and 
Pluck's criteria, we identify a suitable event window for the test. 4 
The "natural experiment" provided by the 2007-08 recession helps solve the 
endogenous problem of capital structure choice, and allows us to direct test the 
impact of pre-event financial structure on the within-event product market 
performance. 
First, the macro-environment shock brought about an unexpected change to the 
market environment. From 90's firms had experienced a golden period of expansion, 
but beginning in 2007 they suddenly faced tight monetary policy and sharp decline 
in the demand. Figure 1 shows the 3-year lending rate and deposits rate from 2000 to 
2009. In order to control the inflation rate, the People's Bank of China began to 
employ contractionary policies and these rates rise sharply from the second quarter 
of 2007 until the third quarter of 2008. We notice that during 2007-08 these rates 
reach the highest point since 2000. As Figure 2 shows, due to the global economic 
slowdown this period is also characterized by a sharp decline of industry activity. 
The year-to-year GDP growth rate slumped since the fourth quarter of 2007 and has 
4 First, the event should be an exogenous, real-side shock. Second, the event should allow for unanticipated 
effects of financial structure. Third, it should not be industry-specific, but affect a large cross-section of industries 
at the same time. For more details, see Campello and Fluck (2003). 
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not yet recovered until the last quarter of 2008, which is in line with our argument of 
"2007 -08 recession". The suddenly changed economic situation provides an 
exogenous, real-side shock to the competitive environment; as a result the capital 
structure should not have been pre-determined in anticipation of this shock. 
Second, because the global financial market suffered from the credit crunch at the 
same time, it is difficult for companies to issue new shares on the stock market or 
renegotiate contracts with creditors. For example, in 2008 the CSRC temporarily 
suspended the IPO on A-share market. The nature of the event-window makes it 
unlikely that companies could quickly adjust their capital structure to the negative 
shock. 
Third, the 2007-08 recession is not an industry specific event, but affects all firms 
in the market. Thus we are able to study the relation between a firm's market 
performance and its industry-adjusted financial structure across various industries. 
In this section, we argue that the endogenous problem will be lessened against the 
background of the exogenous shock in both demand and credit. According to the 
theory, we should expect to observe those firms respond differently to the shock 
depending on their pre-existing financial structure and on the leverage of their rivals. 
4.2 Data and Variables 
4.2.1 Sample selection 
We begin our sample selection process by identify a set of firms that have been 
listed on A-share and B-share before 2007/01/01. We eliminate the duplicate sample 
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which is listed on A-share and B-share at the same time. Firms that have been 
delisted or suspended listing are discarded. This procedure has two benefits. First, it 
helps ensure that our sample firms' capital structure is pre-determined before the 
2007-2008 event period. And second, because almost all of the delisted and 
suspended listing companies are accompanied by extremely high leverage ratio and 
poor market performance, the exclusion of these companies makes our result more 
credible. 
Our source of data is the CSMAR database and the quarterly financial report of 
each company. We gather quarterly firm-level data on total asset, total debt, gross 
sales, and PPE (plant, property and equipment) for the 2006: IV-2008: Ill period. 
Firms with negative equity are discarded. Consistent with previous literature, we 
classify industries according to CSRC's industry classification standard. Because the 
estimation below uses industry-adjusted data, only industries with a minimum of ten 
firms are kept in the sample. This process generates a final sample consisting of 
1175 firms in 35 industries. 
4.2.2 Variable definition 
A. Firm performance 
The dependent variable, firm performance, is represented as a firm 's 
relative-to-industry sales performance. Traditionally empirical literatures tend to use 
pricing behavior (markup) to reflect how a firm 's financial structure affects its 
competitive behavior (see, e.g., Chevalier, 1995b; Phillips, 1995; Chevalier and 
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Scharfstein, 1996). This measure, however, is inappropriate for our purpose because 
our goal is to measure how the financial structure affects the product market 
outcome, and the pricing behavior is only one of a number of strategies that could be 
employed to · ,affect product market outcome. Instead, we use the firm's 
relative-to-industry sales changes to gauge its performance in the product market. 
Specifically, the firm's relative-to-industry sales changes during 2007-2008 recession 
is defined as the quarterly sales growth rate from 2007: IV-2008: Ill, adjusted for 
industry sales-weighted mean, so that this variable measures the firm's sales growth 
relative to that of its competitors. One shortage of this proxy is that it directly 
measures the competition result and we can not tell the particular mechanism that 
contributing to it. 
Mog(Sales)i ,t = [Log(Sales) 2008:111 - Log(Sales)2007:1v] I 3- industry mean 
B. Leverage 
The most important independent variable, debt obligations of the firm relative to 
their industry peers, is measured by the industry-adjusted ratio of total debt to total 
assets. Several alternative forms of leverage were used in other studies, including 
long term debt to book value of asset and total debt to market value of the firm 
( Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Fama and French, 2002). This 
measure is suitable for our study for at least two reasons. First, it is difficult to 
distinguish the long-term and short-term liability in China because many companies 
extend the short term liability continuously and utilize the short-term credit in the 
long-term. And second, because nearly two-thirds shares of Chinese listed firms are 
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non-tradable shares, the market value of listed companies can not capture the true 
value of the whole company. 
This variable is defined as the difference between the ratio of the book value of 
total debt to total asset of a sample firm in 2007: IV (the quarter before the recession 
I 
starts), and the industry-specific asset-weighted mean. 
C. Size 
We control for the size effect in the estimation. Warner ( 1977) and Ang et al. 
( 1982) theorize that bankruptcy costs relative to assets decline and thus the 
advantage of debt financing grows as firms get larger. Additionally, large firms are 
less prone to bankruptcy than small firms because they generally are more 
diversified and have less volatile income streams relative to small firms. As a result, 
costs of debt are relatively lower for large firms, and large firms therefore will carry 
more debt relative to assets than small firms. Further, larger assets imply a higher 
borrowing capacity. Without controlling for it, the leverage coefficient may be biased. 
(Campello and Fluck, 2006). The size of the firm is given as the log of average total 
assets (SIZE), the same proxy used by Ferri and Jones (1979) and Friend and Lang 
(1988). 
D.PPE 
If the manager 1s optimistic, he will increase the fixed investment and the 
production capability. Thus we should expect a positive relationship between the log 
change of fixed asset and firm's market share. In addition, As noted by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) as well as Myers (1977), shareholders have an incentive to invest 
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sub-optimally to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders unless the debt is 
collateralized. As the collateralizable fixed assets rise, the moral hazard is mitigated 
and the cost of debt financing falls. As a result, the amount of fixed asset may be 
positively related to the leverage. 
The proxy for change in fixed assets is the log change of gross property, plant, and 
equipment. 
4.2.3 Summary statistics 
We report the summary statistics of the sample firm in Table 1. The observation of 
our samples is evenly distributed among 3 5 industries, in which the manufacturing 
companies (the industry code starts with "C") account for 62% of the whole sample. 
The single industry's leverage varies from a low of 39 percent in beverage to a high 
of 72 percent in architecture. The mean leverage is equal to 56% which indicates that 
the firms in our sample, on average, have a debt level below the medium of the G-7 
countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Consistent with the negative shock, we notice 
that during the 2007: IV to 2008 : Ill period, the average quarterly sales growth rate 
for sample firms is -1 o/o. We also notice that about 68 percent of the sample firms 
experience a negative sales growth during the recession period. 
4.3 Empirical results 
4.3.1 Methodology 
The baseline model we use focuses on the sensitivity of sales growth to leverage, 
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after controlling for fixed asset investment and firm size. 
4 4 
Mog(Sales); ,1 =1]+ LakMog(Assets)i,t-k + LflkMog(PPE);,t-k +8Leveragei,t-l +&;,1 k=l k=l 
The left-hand side dependent variables are measured within the recession period 
while the right-hand side variables are calculated before the recession. The 
I 
dependent variable is the average quarterly change in sales over the 2007: IV- 2008: 
Ill recession period, which is computed as the difference between the log of sales in 
2008: Ill and the log of sales in 2007: IV, divided by three. We adjust all the 
dependent variable for industry-specific sales weighted means, so it reflects the 
firm's market performance relative to its industry peers. All observations of the 
independent variable are also adjusted according to the industry means. For example, 
the leverage is adjusted based on industry-specific asset weighted average leverage. 
We first estimate the baseline model using pooled data from the 2007-08 period to 
examine the sensitivity of firm's market performance to its debt burden facing 
exogenous negative shock (Hypothesis 1 ). We then examine whether the sensitivity 
varies among industries presenting different leverage level (Hypothesis 2). 
Specifically, we rank industries according to the asset-weighted leverage in 2007: IV 
(the quarter before the recession period). Next, based on the average leverage 
ranking we divide the sample into three parts, the "low-debt", "medium-debt" and 
"high-debt". Then we estimate the baseline model for each subsample. 
4.3.2 Results 
The estimation 1n Table 2 exam1nes whether firm 's market performance 1s 
30 
sensitive to its pre-existing financing decisions. I simply pool firms in all industry 
together and regress industry-adjusted sales changes on leverage after controlling for 
fixed asset investment and firm size. In the first regression (column 1, Table 2), all 
the control variables are included and a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient -0.056 for leverage is returned. The estimates suggest that the sales of a 
firm with a leverage ratio 10 percent above its industry average before the recession 
is expected to grow nearly 0.6 percent less than its rivals in each quarter during the 
recession period. The result is consistent with our first hypothesis and similar to 
Campello and Fluck (2006), in which the US data during 1990-91 recession is 
employed and returns a -0.03 73 coefficient for leverage. 
However, of great interest is the variation of the performance-leverage relation 
across industries with different debt level. Although the 2007-08 recession provides 
an exogenous shock to the market and thus enable us to examine company's 
performance under existing financial structures, we can not rule out the possibility 
that some firm-specific characteristics could influence both a firm's financial 
decision before the recession starts and its sales performance during the recession. 
Fortunately, the theory provides a method to address the concern. Our model predicts 
that the sensitivity of a firm 's market performance to its debt level will change 
according to the financial status of its rivals. Thus when we divide the sample into 
several subsamples based on industry debt level, the coefficient for leverage should 
be different across subsamples, and if the observed negative coefficient for leverage 
is attributed to certain unobservable firm characteristics, the coefficient for leverage 
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should be constant across subsamples. 
Table 3 compares the estimation of firm's sales-debt sensitivity in industries where 
rivals are less leveraged with those in industries where rivals are more leveraged. We 
first rank the · sample industries according to industry asset-weighted leverage in 
2007: IV, the quarter before the recession starts. Next, we divide the sample 
industries into deciles and estimate the baseline model separately for firms 
competing in low-leverage industries and in high-leverage industries. Our focus is to 
compare the differences in sales-leverage sensitivities of firms in industries with 
different leverage level. In the first set of estimation, we define firms in industries 
whose leverage level is ranked in the lowest decile of all the industries as 
"low-leverage group", those in the highest leverage decile as "high-leverage group", 
and the remaining firms as "medium-leverage group". Interestingly, we notice that 
when we move from low-leverage group to high-leverage group, the coefficient for 
leverage 1ncreases from -0.1219 1n low-leverage group to -0.0492 1n 
medium-leverage group and -0.0296 in high-leverage group, and the coefficient even 
become non-significant in high-leverage group ( Column 2-4, Table 3). The results 
implies that, suppose there are two high-leveraged firms operating in low-leverage 
group and high-leveraged group respectively, both firms' leverage ratios are 1 
percent higher than industry means, then when suffering from negative exogenous 
shocks, the quarterly sales growth rate of the firm in low-leverage group is 10 
percent lower than the one in high-leverage group. The result we obtained is 
consistent with Campello and Fluck (2006) again, in which the estimated sensitivity 
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of sales to leverage changes from significantly negative ( -0.08) to slightly positive 
(0.01) as one moves from low- to high-leveraged industries. 
One possible explanation of the positive relation between sales-leverage 
sensitivity and industry leverage level may be that the low-leverage industry tends to 
I 
be an industry with high business risk and firms in more cycle-sensitive industries 
are more likely to choose lower debt ratio. Hence, those firms carrying excess debt 
burden in the low-leverage industry suffer more from the declining demand than 
firms operating in high-leverage industry. 
Overall, these results suggest that during the year of recession, firms with higher 
leverage underperform their industry peers (Hypothesis 1 ). And the debt-burden hurt 
firm's market performance more severely when the firm is operating in a 
low-leverage industry (Hypothesis 2).Both of these findings are consistent with the 
prediction of our theory. 
4.4 Robustness test 
4.4.1 Different industry leverage ranking cut-offs 
In previous section we divide the sample into three subsamples according to 
industry leverage level to test the hypothesis 2. And our finding is consistent with the 
argument of our theory that the sensitivity of industry-adjusted sales growth 
decreases as the industry leverage level increases. In order to verify that this 
empirical result always holds whatever criteria we use to separate industry groups, 
we use alternative cut-offs to classify industry debt groups. 
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When we split the industries into bottom 2 vs. top 2 deciles and bottom 3 vs. top 3 
deciles, the same pattern is observed again. The result is reported in column 5-l 0 of 
Table 3. In the bottom 2 vs. top 2 deciles division, the absolute value of coefficient 
decreases from, 0.1008 to 0.0475, and become non-significant in the high-leverage 
I 
group. In the bottom 3 vs. top 3 division, when moving from the low-leverage group 
to high-leverage group, we also notice a significant decrease in the sensitivity of 
industry-adjusted sales growth. 
4.4.2 Manufacturing industries only 
In most of the capital structure literatures, the sample is limited in manufacturing 
industry only. The reason is that companies in other industries, for example the 
financial industry, vary a lot in the business model and leverage level. In this part we 
classify industries according to CSRC's industry classification standard and restrict 
the analysis to firms operating in the CO-C99 range (manufacturing). Other selection 
criterias are the same as the baseline model. 
The estimation result in Table 4 column 1 suggests that when including all the 
controlling variables, the sales of a firm with a leverage ratio 10 percent above its 
industry average before the recession is expected to grow nearly 0.4 percent less than 
its rivals in each quarter during the recession period. The coefficient for leverage 
equals to -0.0397, which is more close to the -0.0373 estimation in Campello and 
Fluck (2006), which employs data of firms operating in the 200-399 SIC range 
(manufacturing). In the remaining part of table 4, we estimate various version of the 
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baseline model to assess the impact of control variables on the leverage coefficient. 
We notice that in all cases the leverage coefficient remains significantly less than 
zero and the magnitude is relatively stable. 
We also rep·eat the test for hypothesis 2 using the manufacturing industries sample. 
Under the Bottom 2 vs. Top 2 Decile cut-off, the coefficient for leverage equals to 
-0.1479 in industries where low debt is the norm. The magnitude of the coefficient 
decreases quickly when we move to industries with higher average leverage level. 
Actually in the medium and top 2 deciles, the coefficient is non-significant. The 
result is consistent with the implication of our theory and the empirical outcome of 
the baseline model. 
4.4.3 Alternative model specification 
In this part we show that the empirical result we have identified in the baseline 
model is robust to various alternative model specifications. In column 2-5 of table 2, 
we estimate various version of the baseline model to assess the impact of PPE and 
total asset on the leverage coefficient. We notice that in all cases the leverage 
coefficient remains significantly less than zero and the magnitude is relatively stable. 
In column 5, we estimate a model where the only regressor is leverage. Compared 
with the baseline model, it is slightly less negative but still significantly different 
from zero. 
In table 5 we adopt the model specification in Campello and Pluck (2006). We 
control in the regression analysis for possible firm-specific characteristics 
contributing to performance in the long-run by including lags of sales growth. A 
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similar coefficient for leverage is returned. In the remaining part of table 5, we 
exclude several controlling variables. While the leverage coefficient is more negative 
without inclusion of lagged sales growth and lagged asset growth (column 2, 4, and 
5; Table 5), it is slightly less negative but still statistically different from zero 
I 
without controlling for lagged PPE (column 3, Table 5). The reason that the 
exclusion of lagged PPE helps return larger coefficients for leverage both in table 2 
and table 5 may be that investment spending may have been financed with debt and 
it helps control for the underlying positive correlation between debt and 
performance. 
In a word, our results that leverage has negative impact on the industry-adjusted 
market performance during recession holds under various alternative model 
specifications. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we examine the impact of leverage on firm 's product market 
performance using both firm and industry level information during 2007-08 
recession. Regression analysis shows that the pre-existing debt burden has negative 
effect on firm's market share growth during recession, and the magnitude of this 
effect is determined by the industry characteristics. Specifically, if the company 
operates in an industry where low leverage is prevailing, it will be impacted more 
seriously by the debt burden. On contrary, if the company operates in a high 
leveraged industry, the negative impact of debt burden becomes not so significant. 
36 
Chapter 5 Does the ownership structure matter: The 
state shareholding and firm performance 
In this section we examine the impact of ownership structure on firm's product 
market performance during recession. Growing in a transition economy, Chinese 
I 
companies have several distinguishing features in the ownership structure compared 
with those in the developed countries and other developing countries. First, in the 
Anglo-American model, share ownership is dispersed, while in the German-Japanese 
model which China adopt, core investors own significant stakes. Second, the 
privatization of Chinese SOE follows a gradual process (Qian et al., 1999), and in 
most publicly listed companies, state-owned shares still account for a large 
proportion. Third, in China the major source of debt financing is bank loans, and a 
very interesting phenomenon is that both of the debtor and the creditor may be 
state-owned enterprises. These characteristics require further investigation of the 
Chinese story. 
5.1 Literature and hypothesis 
Traditionally state ownership is viewed as inefficient and even detrimental. First, 
because the well being of government officers is not tied to the performance of 
state-owned listed firms, they are not adequately motivated to monitor and improve 
company's performance. Second, the goal of government is to maximize social 
welfare rather than maximize firm's profit. Government usually require SOEs to take 
on social responsibility such as hiring unnecessary labors to increase employment 
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rate, or maintaining the stability of sale price, which distorts firm's behavior in the 
market(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Third, the widespread corruption phenomenon in 
government further exacerbates the problem. Politicians may transfer resources of 
firms to their political supporters (Shleifer and Vishny 1998), which normally are at 
I 
the expense of corporate profitability (Shapiro and Willig, 1992; Boycko et al. 1996). 
The majority of empirical research supports that state ownership is detrimental 
to firm value. Megginston et al. ( 1994) compare corporate performance before and 
after privatization and find that the decrease of state ownership improves corporate 
performance. However, there are also some contradictory evidences. For example, 
Tian (2001) documents that the impact of state ownership on firm 's value is a 
U-shape curve. That is the corporate value is lower with a larger stake of government 
ownership when the government is a small shareholder, but it increases with 
increased state shareholding when the government is a large shareholder. He argues 
that it is because the government turns from a grabbing hand to a helping hand with 
the increase of stakes. 
This paper tries to look at the role of government ownership from a different 
aspect. Besides analyzing the direct interaction between state shareholder and firms, 
we mainly focus on the implicit effect of state shareholding on firm, its industry 
peers and customers. The story is as follows. In view of social and economic benefit, 
the government is reluctant to see SOEs going bankruptcy. Because the creditors are 
state-owned banks, the state-owned leveraged companies may not have to pay back 
all the debt and they can borrow as much as possible without worry about financial 
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constraint or bankruptcy (Kornai, 1980), which is called "soft budget constraint". As 
a result, in the competitive product market, a leveraged SOE is less likely to suffer 
from predatory action of rivals, which decreases the probability of liquidation. 
5.2 Shareholding structure of Chinese listed firms 
In China shares are classified into four categories, A -share, B-share, H -share and 
N-share. Among the four types only the A-shares are held by domestic investors. 
B-shares are sold only to foreign investors. The H -share and N -share are listed in 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange, respectively. Because 
B-, H-and N-shares are denominated in foreign currencies and reserved exclusively 
for foreign investors, most of whom are passive investors (Qi, 2000), we define them 
as Foreign Shares. 
A-share could be further divided into four classes according to holder's nature. 
The State Shares are held by the central government, local government, or solely 
state-owned enterprises. The Legal Person Shares are owned by institutional 
investors including stock companies, financial institutions other than banks, and 
SOEs that have at least one non-state owner. The Tradable A-shares is the only type 
of equity that could be traded freely in the stock exchange, and they are held and 
traded mostly by individual investors. We use Other Shares to denote the remaining 
shares, including shares offered to employees and managers. 
As shown in table 6, a typical listed Chinese company has a mixed ownership 
consisting of three groups of shareholders-the state, the legal persons, and domestic 
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individual investors. On average the state holds a stake of 25.9%, the legal person as 
a whole accounts for 15.5o/o, and the tradable A-share takes 53.4%. The statistic 
report as of the end of 2007 differs a lot from Qi (2000), in which the state, legal 
persons and individual investors of tradable A-shares each account for about one 
third of total shares outstanding, respectively. The sharp increase of tradable A-share 
is natural that China has carried out the Non-tradable Shares Reform since 2005. 
Table 6 also reports ownership structure of listed companies in 2007 by industries. 
The result is reported in descending order of state shareholding ratio. The state holds 
a large stake in mineral industry (BOl, 46.2%) and utility industry (DOl, 40.2%), and 
lowest in retail industry (H11 , 17.2o/o), textile industry (C13, 15.2o/o) and plastics 
manufacturing industry (C49, 11.7%), while the proportion of legal person share is 
just the opposite. and This reflects the Chinese government's policy of controlling 
the important natural resources and heavy investment in infrastructure project. The 
averages of foreign and other are less than 1 Oo/o in all the 3 5 industries. Because 
most listed companies do not have foreign and other classes of shares, we focus on 
the effects of state, legal person and tradable A -share on corporate performance in 
this paper. 
Another feature of Chinese companies is the highly concentrated ownership 
structure. Xu and Wang (1999) shows that in 1995 the five largest shareholders 
accounted 58o/o of the outstanding shares in China, compared with 57.8o/o in the 
Czech Republic, 79o/o in Germany, and 3 3 o/o in Japan. However, we will not explore 
this feature here. 
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5.3 Empirical findings 
To examine hypothesis 3, we need to compare the product market performance of 
state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. The method is to introduce 
variable denoting state ownership and its interaction with leverage into the baseline 
I 
model. We use three alternative ways to classify state-owned enterprises and 
non-state-owned enterprises: 1) mixed enterprises and private enterprises. The 
private enterprises are defined as companies without state shares. The enterprises 
with state shareholding more than 0% but less than 1 OOo/o are grouped as the mixed 
enterprises; 2) firms where the government is the largest shareholder and firms 
whose largest shareholder is non-government entity. By saying largest shareholder, 
we mean that the proportion of state shareholding is greater than all of the other four 
categories; 3) firms where the government is the majority shareholder and firms 
whose majority shareholder is non-government entity. Holding more than 50% 
shares, the majority shareholder has the absolute control. 
Then we obtain three dummy variables mix, largest and majority . The value 
of mix equals to one if the company is a mixed enterprises, otherwise it equals to 0. 
If the government is the largest shareholder, the value of largest equals to 1, 
otherwise 0. If the government is the majority shareholder, the value of maj ority 
equals to 1, otherwise 0. From mix enterprises to firms where state is the majority 
shareholder, the average degree of state ownership increases. 
Table 7 shows that when we introduce mix to the baseline model, the coefficient is 
non-significant. But the interaction of mix and leverage returns a significant positive 
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coefficient 0.0631. This finding confirms that during recession, the financial 
constrained company will suffer less if it has government background. Suppose a 
firm's leverage ratio is 10 percent higher than industry average, its sales growth rate 
will be 0.98 percent lower than industry peers if it is a private-owned firm (column 2, 
I 
table 7), while only 0.35 (that is "( -0.0981 +0.0631 )* 1 0") percent lower if it is a mix 
enterprise. The result is consistent with the theory prediction that state shareholder 
will help leveraged firm during recession so that the company can survive in the 
second period, thus the company has the incentive to maintain the market share and 
the customers will not switch to other suppliers. 
The same pattern is observed again when we include largest in the baseline model. 
The cross-term of largest and leverage has a coefficient equals to 0.1 and is 
significant at 5o/o level. Suppose a firm's leverage ratio is 10 percent higher than 
industry average, its sales growth rate will be 0. 764 percent lower than industry 
peers if government is not the largest shareholder (column 4, table 7), while it could 
even gain a more rapid growth rate 0.236 (that is"( -0.0764+0.1 )* 1 0") percent higher 
if state holds more shares than other equity holders. 
The empirical finding strongly support hypothesis 3a that the state ownership of 
companies has a positive contribution to the firm market share when they adopt 
higher degrees of leverage than industry average. The performance of state-owned 
leveraged firms far exceeds those without state shareholder. This implies that for 
high leveraged firms, state shareholder tends to act as a helping hand. Further, we 
prove hypothesis 3 b that with the growth of state ownership, its positive effect on 
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financial constrained firms during recession becomes more significant. The reason 
might be that comparing with firms where state is only a small shareholder, the firms 
with state as the largest shareholder usually have closer relationship with the 
government and thus the ability to obtain more preferential policies. 
However, one confusing thing presented in Table 7 is that the coefficient of 
majority x leverage is non-significant when state holds more than 5 Oo/o shares (column 
3, table 7). We propose that when state has the absolute control, it probably tends 
from a helping hand to a grasping hand because no one can restrict its behavior. This 
result is kind of different from Tian (200 1 ), who finds that when the proportion of 
state shares exceeds 40o/o, the corporate value begins to increase, while when the 
proportion of state shares is lower than 40%, the corporate value decreases with the 
growth of state shares (the "U-shape"). 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This paper studies the implication of financial structures and state ownership on 
firms' product market behavior. We develop a theoretical model in which two firms 
with different · debt level, consumers facing switching cost and the state shareholder 
operate together, to determine the product price and market share of each company. 
We present four theoretical predictions on the interaction between financial structure, 
state ownership, and firm's product market performance. 
Consistent with these predictions, using data of Chinese listed firms over the 
2007-08 recession, we provide evidence that the firm with higher leverage than 
industry peers tends to loss larger market shares when there is a negative shock to 
the economy. We also find that the negative effect of debt burden is stronger for 
firms that operate in industries with low debt level. Additionally, we show that for 
state-owned firms the market share losses during recession is less significant than a 
private firm with similar leverage level. Finally, we show that when the proportion of 
state shares is lower than 50o/o, its benefit increases, while when the proportion of 
state shares exceeds 50o/o, state ownership is less helpful in preventing leveraged 
firm from losing market share during recession. 
Our paper adds to the theoretical literature on the interaction of financial 
leverage and product market performance. The innovation of this paper is to 
introduce state shareholder into the traditional framework composed of consumers, 
company, and industry rival. As far as we know, none of the existing literatures have 
analyzed these factors simultaneously. The empirical evidence of this paper adds to 
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previous literature by showing the consistent results using Chinese data. Further, our 
paper is the first attempt to exam the beneficial effect of state ownership for high 
leverage companies during recession. 
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Figure 1 Tightening monetary policy in 2007-08 
This figure shows the Chinese lending rates on less than 3-year loan and the deposits rate on 
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Figure 2 Decreasing Gross Domestic Product in 2007-08 
This Figure displays the series for total industrial production In the form of GDP (Gross 
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Table 1 summary statistics 
Industries are defined according to CSRC's industry classification standard. Only industries with 
a minimum of ten firms are kept in the sample. The leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt 
to total asset in 2007 : IV (the quarter before the recession starts). The quarterly sales growth rate 
is computed as [Log (Sales) 2007: IV - Log (Sales) 2008: III]/3. The industry mean of leverage and 
sales growth rat~ are asset-weighted and sales-weighted respectively. 
Industry Industry description Number of Industry Industry 
Code observations asset-weighted sales-weighted 
leverage growth rate 
AOl Agriculture 17 0.58 -0.08 
BOl Coal mining and dressing 17 0.47 0.08 
COl Food processing 23 0.47 -0.01 
cos Beverage manufacturing 25 0.39 0.00 
Cll Textile 43 0.55 -0.12 
C13 Manufacturers of clothes and other fiber products 18 0.54 -0.01 
C31 Paper making and paper products 24 0.57 -0.02 
C41 Oil processing and refining 11 0.40 0.01 
C43 Chemical material and products manufacturing 91 0.53 0.01 
C47 Chemical fibers Manufacturing 17 0.42 -0.02 
C49 Plastic manufacturing 14 0.56 0.02 
C51 Electronic parts and components manufacturing 30 0.44 -0.02 
C55 Daily use electronic equipment manufacturing 13 0.59 -0.01 
C61 Non-metal mineral products 52 0.58 0.00 
C65 Ferrous metal foundries and presses 30 0.56 0.04 
C67 Non-ferrous metal foundries and presses 26 0.57 0.01 
C69 Metal products 17 0.54 0.01 
C71 Common machines manufacturing 35 0.53 -0.04 
C73 Special equipment manufacturing 48 0.58 0.00 
C75 Traffic equipment manufacturing 64 0.57 -0.01 
C76 Electric equipment and parts manufacturing 45 0.66 -0.04 
C78 Instrument, meter, stationery and office machine 11 0.53 -0.09 
C81 Medicine manufacturing 72 0.49 0.00 
C99 Other manufacturing 19 0.53 -0.01 
DOl Electric power, gas and water production 57 0.58 0.01 
EOI Civil engineering works construction 28 0.72 -0.03 
Fll Transportation subsidiary service 33 0.40 0.00 
G81 Communications and equipment manufacturing 31 0.60 -0.02 
G87 Computer application service 31 0.49 -0.05 
Hll Retail trade 55 0.61 -0.01 
H21 Commercial brokerage and agency service 19 0.67 0.01 
JO l Real estate development and operation 60 0.63 -0.18 
K01 Public facilities service 14 0.50 -0.05 
K34 Travel industry 14 0.48 -0.05 
M Comprehensive 71 0.57 -0 .07 
Entire sample 35 1175 0.56 -0.0 1 
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Table 2 Regression analysis: The impact of capital structure on market performance 
This table reports the regression results of the baseline model using pooled data. The dependent 
variable is quarterly sales growth rate which is computed as [Log (Sales) 2007: IV- Log (Sales) 2008: 
III]/3. Leverage is computed as the debt-to-asset ratio using firm-level book data in 2007: IV and 
adjusted for industry asset-weighted mean .. The dependent variable is measured within the 
recession period (from 2007: IV to 2008: Ill) while the independent variables are calculated 
before the rec~ssion. All variables are adjusted according to industry means. Numbers within 
parentheses are .. p-values. Standard deviations are in the parenthesis. The asterisks behind the 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 Robust test: The impact of capital structure on market performance (manufacturing only) 
This table reports the regression results of the baseline model using manufacturing industry 
pooled data (CO-C99 according to CSRC's industry classification standard). The dependent 
variable is quarterly sales growth rate which is computed as [Log (Sales) 2007: IV- Log (Sales) 2008: 
111]13. Leverage is computed as the debt-to-asset ratio using firm-level book data in 2007: IV and 
adjusted for in~ustry asset-weighted mean .. The dependent variable is measured within the 
recession period '(from 2007: IV to 2008: Ill) while the independent variables are calculated 
I 
before the recession. All variables are adjusted according to industry means. Numbers within 
parentheses are p-values. Standard deviations are in the parenthesis. The asterisks behind the 

















































































































































Table 5 Robust test: The impact of capital structure on market performance (control for past 
sales) 
This table reports the regression results of the baseline model using pooled data. The dependent 
variable is quarterly sales growth rate which is computed as [Log (Sales) 2008: 111- Log (Sales) 
2007:Iv]/3. Leverage is computed as the debt-to-asset ratio using firm-level book data in 2007: IV 
and adjusted fo~ industry asset-weighted mean .. The dependent variable is measured within the 
recession periop (from 2007: IV to 2008: Ill) while the independent variables are calculated before 
the recession. All variables are adjusted according to industry means. Numbers within parentheses 
are p-values. Standard deviations are in the parenthesis. The asterisks behind the coefficient show 
the range ofP-values: ***asp-value~ 1 o/o, ** p-value~ So/o, * p-value~ lOo/o. 
OLS estimations 
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Table 6 Summary statistics of ownership structure 
This table summarizes the shareholding structure of Chinese listed firms. Common shares are 
divided into five groups, State, Legal person, A-share, Foreign and Other. The numbers in the cells 
are calculated as the ratio of the corresponding class of shares over total shares. The sum of 
numbers in the same row equals to one. In the last row we report the shareholding structure of all 
sample firms on . average. It is based on the 2007 data for 1175 companies 
Industry Industry Description State Legal A share Foreign Other 
Code person 
BOl coalmining and dressing 0.46 0.08 0.41 0.05 0.00 
C65 Ferrous metal foundries and presses 0.46 0.08 0.45 0.02 0.00 
Fll Transportation subsidiary service 0.41 0.07 0.46 0.05 0.01 
DOl Electric power, gas and water production 0.40 0.05 0.51 0.03 0.00 
C71 Common machines manufacturing 0.36 0.09 0.48 0.07 0.00 
C67 Non-ferrous metal foundries and presses 0.36 0.10 0.48 0.02 0.05 
KOI Public facilities service 0.33 0.10 0.52 0.04 0.00 
C75 Traffic equipment manufacturing 0.33 0.12 0.49 0.04 0.01 
H21 Commercial brokerage and agency service 0.32 0.08 0.57 0.01 0.01 
EOI Civil engineering works construction 0.32 0.11 0.54 0.00 0.03 
AOI Agriculture 0.31 0.10 0.57 0.00 0.01 
C43 Chemical material and products manufacturing 0.31 0.11 0.55 0.01 0.02 
C73 Special equipment manufacturing 0.30 0.11 0.50 0.06 0.04 
K34 Travel industry 0.30 0.15 0.46 0.06 0.03 
C61 Non-metal mineral products 0.29 0.14 0.51 0.04 0.02 
cos Beverage manufacturing 0.25 0.22 0.48 0.04 0.01 
C55 Daily use electronic equipment manufacturing 0.25 0.13 0.51 0.05 0.06 
C31 Papermaking and paper products 0.23 0.18 0.53 0.03 0.03 
C41 Oil processing and refining 0.23 0.27 0.44 0.03 0.04 
C51 Electronic parts and components manufacturing 0.22 0.21 0.51 0.04 0.02 
101 Real estate development and operation 0.22 0.21 0.53 0.03 0.01 
G81 Communications and equipment manufacturing 0.21 0.13 0.57 0.04 0.05 
C47 Chemical fibers Manufacturing 0.20 0.16 0.56 0.04 0.03 
COl Food processing 0.20 0.21 0.55 0.02 0.02 
C81 Medicine manufacturing 0.20 0.17 0.57 0.02 0.03 
C76 Electric equipment and parts manufacturing 0.17 0.20 0.53 0.08 0.02 
H11 Retail trade 0.17 0.16 0.64 0.02 0.01 
C11 Textile 0.17 0.21 0.54 0.04 0.05 
C99 Other manufacturing 0.17 0.28 0.51 0.03 0.02 
C78 Instrument, meter, stationery and office machine 0.15 0.24 0.56 0.05 0.00 
C13 Manufacturers of clothes and other fiber products 0.15 0.31 0.46 0.08 0.00 
M Comprehensive 0.14 0.21 0.64 0.00 0.00 
C69 Metal products 0.14 0.28 0.50 0.06 0.02 
G87 Computer application service 0.12 0.23 0.59 0.01 0.05 
C49 Plastic manufacturing 0.12 0.20 0.64 0.00 0.05 
Average 0.26 0.16 0.53 0.03 0.02 
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Table 7 Regression analysis: The interaction of state ownership and capital structure on market 
performance 
This table reports the regressions of baseline model after introducing the variable which stands for 
the government shareholding. 
1 2 3 4 
0.0025 0.0032 0.0025 0.0028 
1] 
(0.384) (0.570) (0.381 ) (0.396) 
Leverage,.,1_ 1 
-0.0560*** -0.0981 *** -0.0559*** -0.0764*** 









majority x leverage -0.1966 (0.462) 
-0.0013 
mzx (0.844) 
mix x leverage 
0.0631 * 
(0.082) 
Mog(Assets),. ,1_ 1 
-0.0703*** -0.0699*** -0.0703*** -0.0686*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mog(Assets),. ,1_ 2 
-0.0447** -0.0446** -0.0444** -0.0419* 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.053) 
Mog(Assets),. ,1_ 3 
0.0335 0.0371 0.0335 0.0356 
(0.177) (0.136) (0.177) (0.152) 
Mog(Assets),. ,1_ 4 
-0.0060 -0.0032 -0.0059 -0.0059 
(0.799) (0.894) (0.803 ) (0.804) 
0.0035 0.0037 0.0035 0.0042 
Mog(PPE),. ,1_ 1 (0.607) (0.590) (0.615) (0.545 ) 
0.0069 0.0044 0.0074 0.0080 
Mog(P P E),. ,1_ 2 (0.597) (0.733 ) (0.570) (0.540) 
0.0427*** 0.0430*** 0.0429*** 0.0431 *** 
Mog(PPE),. ,1_ 3 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.0330*** 0.0323*** 0.0330*** 0.0332*** 
Mog(PPE),. ,1_ 4 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
adj.R2 0.0413 0.0426 0.0403 0.0449 
Sample size 1,167 1,167 1,164 1,157 
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